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The Federal budget is considered by many to be the
key instrument in the formulation of national policy, for
it is through the budget that the country decides what
services will be provided through government and what areas
will be left to private choice. When Congress enacts the
budget into law it is determining for its constituency what
government services will be financed at the federal level
rather than at the state or local level; in terms of what
program and at what cost. Further, the budget serves as a
primary instrument of fiscal policy to ensure the stability
and growth of our economy. As a result, the budget has
become a document that exerts a manor influence on the
decision-making process in the federal government.
It is of primary importance that the agencies of
the federal government participate intelligently in making
the major decisions that focus on the budget; the overall
size of government; emphasis on different government pro-
grams intended to benefit the country; the efficiency and
effectiveness of these programs; and the fiscal policies
designed to promote national prosperity.
The Implementation in 1962 of planning, programming,
budgeting in the Department of Defense created a new

benchmark for sophistication in the management of govern-
ment. The development and implementation of this new system
is usually attributed to two men, former Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara and his Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller), Charles J. Hitch. In their view the system
was not to be looked upon as a decision-making device but
rather as a means by which better decisions might be made.
The new process was used in the preparation and presentation
to the members of the Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees of the fiscal year 1963, 1964, and 1965 defense
budgets
.
In August 1965, all agencies of the federal govern-
ment were instructed by Presidential executive order to
develop and implement planning, programming, budgetary
systems. In President Johnson's words, this system would
enable public decision-makers to:
(1) Identify our national goals with precision
and on a continuing basis;
(2) Choose among those goals the ones that are
most urgent;
(3) Search for alternative means of reaching
those goals most effectively at the least cost;
(4) Inform ourselves not merely on next year's
costs, but on the second, and third, and subsequent-
year's costs of our programs;
(5) Measure the performance of our programs to
insure a dollar's worth of service for each dollar
spent .
1
lyndon B. Johnson, "Statement by the President to
Members of the Cabinet and Heads of Agencies, August 25,
1965," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , Vol. I,
August 50, 1965.

The President's judgment stemmed from the successful
introduction of systems analysis in the Department of Defense
where cost effectiveness studies were applied to major
departmental decisions in the consideration of and choice
among competing alternatives. Precedence for this approach
within the Department of Defense could be found in the
decision-making process for public expenditure projects in
the water resources budget, where evaluation by cost-benefit
measurements had been conducted since the mid-1950' s.
Since the inception of the planning-programming-
budgeting system, there has been continuing discussion and
debate on program analysis and the analytical techniques
utilized in the PPB system approach. Further, many have
argued that the ideas inherent in PPB do not reflect a
radical change in our approach to the budgetary process.
It is the purpose of this paper to trace historical
budget reforms to determine their relationship to planning,
programming, budgeting within the Department of Defense.
An investigation of the significant stages in the evolution
of our budget process will be accomplished by analyzing
significant budget reforms.
Emphasis is directed toward the impact of these
reforms on agency budget procedures in order to provide an
understanding of the current planning, programming, budgeting
system within the Defense establishment. Areas in which
research has been accomplished for this study include Acts
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of Congress, Presidential directives, special studies and
commissions as well as past budgetary and fiscal policies.
In this respect, the period 19^5-1970 has "been stressed as
the area of particular interest, for it was with the advent
of the Cold War, coupled with advancements in technology
resulting from the unprecedented research of World War II
and the increases in dollar costs associated with implement-
ing the potential they created, that there arose repeated
calls for economy and efficiency from the American public.
In this atmosphere President Truman expressed his belief
that "we should integrate our strategic plans, our budget,
1
and the military program." While the initial legislation
as enacted fell far short of these goals, the 19^7 reorgani-
zation of the military establishment under a Secretary of
Defense authorized to establish broad policies and programs
can still be considered a major step toward budget reform.
It was to have an impact on the budgetary process within the
Department of Defense and would lead to the existing centrali-
zation of financial power in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense.
Since the planning, programming, budgeting process
presently in effect in the Department of Defense is
directly related to the budget reforms in the federal govern-
ment, this paper is organized to reflect the legislative
enactments, executive directives, and related procedures
C. W. Borklund, The Department of Defense (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger , 1967.), p. 16.

which created the environment for reform. A further objec-
tive is to analyze the developments that have occurred since
adoption of the planning, programming, budgeting approach
with the focus directed toward a conclusion as to the status
of the system as it exists today.

CHAPTER I
EARLY STAGES OR BUDGET POLICY, 1798-1921
Formative Year s
There are many definitions and characteristics
which have "been used to identify the federal budget process.
A most general definition is that budgeting is concerned
with the translation of financial resources into human
purposes. Inherent in this definition are the implications
that the budget is a planning document, a contract between
the President, Congress and the agencies of the government,
a central mechanism for mutual obligations as well as a
focus of social, economic and political efforts. Our
current budget system can be viewed as a product of these
complex associations that emerged from the budget process
as It developed during the formative years in our
government.
At the time of the American Revolution the budget
system in Great Britain had not been fully developed.
However, the roots of the British system are founded in
Parliamentary control over the Crown. No individual could
be compelled by the Crown to make any gift, loan,
Aaron V/ildavsky, The Politics of the Budge tarry-




7"benevolence, on tax without the consent of Parliament.
While the Parliament reserved the right to authorize all
expenditures, it did not at that time extend its authority
over the purpose of expenditures . The details of expendi-
tures were gradually controlled and specified. As a point
of interest, this specification extended first to the army,
the navy, and ordnance.
The framers of the Constitution also saw the need
to provide a means for exerting control over the executive
"branch through the appropriation process. As a result, the
Constitution requires that "no money shall be drawn from
the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by
law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts
and expenditures of all public money shall be published from
2time to time. 1 '
Since the financial resources available to the
Continental Congress during the Revolution were inadequate,
upon ratification of the Constitution the Congress initiated
efforts to provide a responsible financial system. Passing
a statute establishing a Treasury Department in 1789, Con-
gress required that the Secretary of the Treasury prepare
and report estimates of public revenue and public expendi-
tures. It was not until 1800 that a supplement to this
Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting (New York
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1956), p. 5-
2
U.S. Constitution , Art. 1, sec. 9-

8statute directed the Secretary to implement a planning
f"unction through the submission of plans for improving or
increasing the public revenues."
Legislative Supremacy
As previously indicated, the Constitution was not
«
specific as to a system for the effective management of
the finances of the federal government beyond the require-
ment that all revenue measures must originate in the House
of Representatives. In the formative years, Alexander
Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury, assumed a
strong executive leadership in financial matters. Through
Hamilton's genius and direct personal administrative initia-
tive the country was lifted from bankruptcy, its credit
established, and its revenues secured. By initiating and
supervising the execution of all financial programs,
Hamilton had assumed the responsibilities of the legislature
and was in effect receiving a "rubber stamp" from the
pCongress on his policies. During this period the relation-
ships between Cabinet officials and members of Congress Were
particularly direct and personal in nature.
However, with the presidency of Thomas Jefferson,




2Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Adminis-
tration (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1964- ) ,
p. w.

9work of Congress was accomplished. The establishment of
the House Ways and Means Committee in 1802 marked the end
of continuous executive direction of government financial
affairs. Both revenue and appropriation authority were
concentrated in this Committee. The executive responsi-
bilities in financial matters were viewed by Congress as
one of reporting only, with the Secretary of the Treasury
accomplishing this function by classifying the expenditure
1proposals and submitting them to the Congress. During the
period 1802-1865, Congress was provided an opportunity for
a comprehensive review of the government's finances through
the hearings of the Ways and Means Committee, where each
government agency appeared and provided testimony. Such
unity in the review of the budget began to dissipate in
1865, with the establishment of the House Appropriations
Committee. By 1885, the authority to recommend appropri-
ations had been vested in eight House committees. Later
this was increased to ten. Similarly, the Senate delegated
2
appropriating authority to eight of its committees.
Although it was becoming more difficult for the
members of Congress to obtain a clear picture of government
expenditures, the supremacy of the legislative had neverthe-
less been established. That this was the overriding
Arthur Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the
United States (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1955),
pp. 53-5ITr
2Burkhead, Gov ernment Bud p;e t ing , p. 11.
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consideration is reflected in Arthur Smithies' analysis of
the budget process:
. . . It is essential to realize that traditional
budgetary procedures have grown out of efforts by
Congress to control the Executive through the
device of highly specific appropriations rather
than the consideration of the requirements of an
effective budgetary process.
1
A further reason fox- Congressional increases in
appropriations committees was that the years from 1880 to
the early 1900' s marked a period of extreme fiscal irrespon-
sibility on the part of Congress. During the years follow-
ing 1789 the government had the problem of how to legally
expend the surpluses which accumulated in the Treasury. The
Federal Government was small and the revenues from customs
and tariffs far exceeded the expenditures. As viewed by
Lewis Kimmel:
. . . the abundance of customs revenue during most
of the nineteenth century made it unnecessary to
weigh expenditures and revenues and brought about a
progressive deterioration of the budget process.
2
However, the era of federal surplus was to end
abruptly and not return again for any length of time. Of
the sixteen fiscal years between 189 y+ and 1909, ten were




2Lewis H. Kimmel, Federal Budget and Fiscal Policy,
1789-1958 (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1959),
p. 15-




Congress' failure to meet its responsibilities in
transacting government business by insuring efficiency and
economy in government quite naturally bred indifference
on the side of the executive. Lucius Vilmerding described
the actions of the executive branch as follows:
The departments governed their expenditures by the
amounts of the estimates rather than by the amounts
of the grants. If in any case less was granted than
was estimated, the department or bureau affected,
instead of revising its plans for the coming year
to bring them within the financial limits of the
reduced appropriations continued them without change
in perfect confidence that Congress would appropriate
supplementary sums when they were requested rather
than stop the service.^
Congressional efforts to control expenditures
and curb deficiencies were unsuccessful. The passage of
the Anti-Deficiency Act of 1906 was supposed to prevent
deficiencies by a system of apportioning appropriations
through the fiscal year. The practice met with only
limited success from a generally lax and inadequate
2financial administration. This experience supports
the contention that a system of budget execution intended
to prevent deficiencies or effect savings as programs are
administered cannot be successful when imposed unilater-
ally by the legislature and lacks the cooperation and
authority of the executive.
Lucius Wilmerding, Jr. , The Spending Power (New






£omTiii_gs_ion_ on Economy and Efficiency
With the advent of increased expenditures by
enlarged government activities and the existence of the
deficit, increased public attention was directed toward
the manner in which the government expended and accounted
for its funds. In 1910, President Taft appointed a Commis-
sion on Economy and Efficiency in Government. The purpose
of this Commission was to examine the fiscal and financial
operations of the federal government and to provide Congress
with recommendations for improvement.
With its responsibilities broadly conceived, the
Commission undertook investigation of five major areas
over the succeeding two years. . They included examination
of (1) the budget as an annual financial program, (2) the
organization and activities of the federal government,
(3) personnel problems, (4) financial records and accounts,
and (5) business practices and procedures in the govern-
ment. After nearly two years of study and research the
Commission completed the first comprehensive study of the
federal budgetary process and provided the foundation for
2





U.S., Commission on Economy and Efficiency, The
Need for a National Budget, 62d Cong., 2d sess., 1912,




Not only were the report of the Commission on the




t " and the President's message to
Congress on Economy and Efficiency in the Government
2Service significant in the development of the budget system
in the federal government, "but of greater significance was
the fact that these documents reflected an assumption that
the President should be responsible for financial planning
and management within the government. . Taf t stressed the
need for establishing a national budget system as a means of
executive management and control. The Commission proposed,
first, a comprehensive executive budget, where previously
none had existed; second, classifying the budget in terms
of programs versus functions, and' additionally a classifica-
tion based on the distinction between capital and current
items; and third, a systematic review of the budget after
its implementation. In subsequent chapters mention will
be made of these same recommendations in connection with
the establishment of the budgetary procedures called for
under the existing system within the Department of Defense.
Conceptually, the Commission conceived the budget
as serving a threefold purpose: to be a document for
1 Ibid .
2U.S., President, Message of the President of the
United Stat e
s__
on Econ orny and Efficiency in the Government
'Service ," b2d Cong., 2d sess.
, 1912, H. Doc . -J-5'8'.'
^Arthur Smithies, "Conceptual Framework for the
Program Budget, Program Budgetin g , ed. by David Novick




Congressional action; to be an instrument of control and
management by the Chief Executive; and to be a basis for the
administration of departments and agencies. On the last
point, the Commission stated:
In order that he [the Administrator] may think intelli-
gently about the subject of his responsibility, he
must have before him regularly statements -which will
reflect results in terms of quality and quantity; he
must be able to measure quality and quantity of results
by units of cost and units of efficiency.
1
As a result, the format of the budget incorporated
in the Commission's report included an itemization of
activity schedules as subdivisions of departmental and agency
expenditures
.
A constitutional issue arose that was a point of
concern to the Commission. At issue was the question of
how a budget system would fit into the governmental structure
based on a separation of powers. In considering this point
the Commission suggested that the budget system was based on
the constitutional theory of trusteeship. The government
was viewed as the trust instrument, the government officials
as the trustees, and the citizens as the beneficiaries and
creators of the trust. The President, as the senior trustee,
should be responsible for the budget. The heads of the
departments and agencies would transmit data to the Presi-
dent in the format that he prescribed, with the Secretary of
the Treasury assisting the President in discharging his
U.S., Commission on Economy and Efficiency, Need
for a National Budget
,
p. 16Z ,L .

15
obligations. The Commission felt that the budget was the
only effective means whereby the President could be made
responsible for getting a definite, comprehensive, and well
evaluated program before the people.
Although the Commission laid the foundation for all
subsequent reforms, the political climate of the times did
not permit action. The elections of 1912 resulted in defeat
for President Taft as well as any hoj)e for implementing the
recommendations of the Commission. In fact, "The report was
not even considered by the Appropriations Committee of the
2House of Representatives to which it was referred."
Furthermore, financial pressures had been eased with good
business conditions, and with the passage of the sixteenth
Amendment, the government had an additional source of revenue
from the personal income tax. The fact that the work of
the Commission on Economy and Efficiency led to no immediate
legislation can also be viewed as an indication of the
extreme deliberation with which the Congress enacts proposals
for reform. Aaron Uildavsky, in appraising the hesitancy to
change exhibited by Congress, has said:
The tradition of reform in America is a noble one,
not easily denied. But in the matter of Congress and
budgetary procedures it is better to identify your
proposal (for change) as a revision or amplification of
present policy. These terms seem not to carry with them









changes in a system with which they [Congress] are
fully acquainted.^
Efforts to establish a national budget system were
not undertaken again until after World War I. However,
when viewed in retrospect, the work of the Taft Commission
contributed greatly to the eventual passage of the Budget
and Accounting Act of 1921.
The Budgeting and Accounting Act of 1921
The continued sense of frustration involved in
efforts both to control estimates and to give adequate
review to expenditures, coupled with the policy of retrench-
ment in government spending following World War I, caused
the Congress again to address the subject of economy and
efficiency in government. The approach taken was three-
fold: (1) fixing executive responsibility for the estimates
submitted to Congress (budget formulation), (2) creating a
new governmental instrument for the audit of executive
accounts, primarily responsible to Congress, and (3) internal
2
consolidation of the Congressional budget system. Congress
had become particularly interested in accounting control as
a means to economy and had come to regard budget execution
as equally as significant as budget formulation.
Wildavsky, Politics of the Budgetary Process,
pp. 131-32. ^ '
2John S. Saloma III, The Responsible Use of Power




The House Select Committee, established in 1919 to
study the federal budget system, expressed the rationale for
the creation of the executive budget and a special budget
staff in these terms:
. . .
the estimates of expenditure needs now submitted
to Congress represent only the desires of the indi-
vidual departments, establishments, and bureaus ....
These requests have been subjected to no superior
revision with a view to bringing them into harmony with
each other, to eliminating duplication of organization
or activities, or of making them, as a whole, conform
to the needs of the Nation as represented by the condi-
tion of the Treasury and respective revenues . . . .
-
L
Congress approved and sent to the President the
first Budget and Accounting Act in 1920. Incorporated in
the bill was the establishment of a General Accounting Office,
to be headed by the Comptroller General. The President would
have the power to appoint but not remove him from office.
President Wilson vetoed the first bill on the ground that
constitutionally appointment and removal power could not be
separated. With the return of the Republicans to office in
the national elections in the fall of 1920 and President
Harding's promises for putting the government on a sound
business basis, the Budget and Accounting Act became law on
June 10, 1921. Under the final provisions of the Act, the
President was vested with the responsibility for transmitting
the national budget to Congress each year- at the beginning
of the session. He was further authorized to submit supple-
mental estimates at his discretion provided they were made
U.S., Congress, Congressional Record
,
66th Cong.,
1st sess., October 17, 1919, p. 7Q83H.
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necessary as the result of laws enacted after the initial
transmission of the budget, or were otherwise determined
to be in the public interest.
The creation of the Bureau of the Budget as the
staff agency to assist the President, and the establishment
of the General Accounting Office responsible to Congress,
are viewed as the major significant changes in governmental
financial management resulting from the passage of the
Budget and Accounting Act. The Bureau as the President's
agent was given the authority to "assemble, correlate,
revise, reduce or increase" the estimates provided by the
departments and agencies. The GAO was empowered to "investi-
gate all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and
applications of public funds" and to provide Congress with
"recommendations looking to greater economy or efficiency
2in public expenditures."
A reflection of the atmosphere and the public atti-
tudes of the times toward the new budget system is contained
in the statement of General Charles Dawes, the first director
of the Bureau of the Budget, to President Harding
:
I wish to say to you, sir, that the men before you
realize the cares and perplexities of your great
position. They realize that at this time the business
of our country is prostrated, that men are out of
employment, that want and desperation stalk abroad,
and that you ask us to do our part in helping you





, sec . 312.
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lift the burden of taxation from the backs of the
people by a reduction in the cost of government.!
Important to this analysis of budget reforms is that
while the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 required the
submission of a comprehensive executive budget, this was to
become an essential step in achieving the comparison of
alternatives in the executive budget, the Act left depart-
2
mental budgets and procedures for preparing them unchanged.
The budget cycle concerned itself with the objects of the
expenditures and failed to direct the attention of budget
proposals to the program for which the money was being
expended or the function with which it was concerned.
Consequently, it was impossible to determine the magnitude
of government expenditures for programs because funds had
been appropriated under numerous appropriations for specific
items unrelated to the programs under which they were to be
expended. Nevertheless, the control process is an important
factor in program budgeting. Although the program budget-
would not be implemented until the early 1960's, the
establishment of an executive budget was an important
contribution to its development.
The installation of a budget system can be viewed
as an assumption of responsibilities by the government that
require an organized executive authority as well as an
Charles G. Dawes, The First Year of the Budp;et of
the United States (Nov/ York: Harper Bros. Publishers, 1923)
,
pp. 18-19.
2Smithies, "Conceptual Framework," p. 30.
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increased importance in government organized economic power
in relation to privately organized economic power. As a
result, the divisions between executive and legislative
authority in the constitution as practiced by the govern-
ment had to be altered before a budget system could be
established. The federal budget system is considered revo-
lutionary in this respect since it was a product of a






REFORMS IN THE BUDGETARY PROCESS, 1921-1955
Growth of the Bureau of the Budget
An evaluation of the Bureau of the Budget since
passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 can be
related to the changes that have occurred in the performance
of two major characteristics of budget preparation: those
of program review and management improvement. The Bureau's
significance In program review has grown with the emergence
of the Executive Office of the President in the federal
government. In management improvement the Bureau's responsi-
bility has changed over the last fifty years from initially
a narrow concern with economy and efficiency to its present
broader concern for effective administration.
During the first decade in the history of the
Bureau, economy and efficiency accomplished by balancing
the budget, reducing the federal debt, and lowering taxes by
reducing expenditures became the fiscal philosophy in govern-
mental operations. The policy objective was to balance







surplus revenues. The first director. General Dawes, con-
ceived the role of the Bureau to be
. . . simply a business organization whose activities
are devoted constantly to the consideration of how
money appropriated by Congress can be made to go as far
as possible toward the accomplishment of the objects
of legislation. If it functions properly, it has not
and can never have any purpose but that of the Execu-
tive and Congress in seeking the imposition, throughout
the government administration, of correct business
principles in routine business administration.^
Although many factors may be considered as contributing to
the surpluses achieved, it should be noted that over the
period 1924-1929 a debt reduction was accomplished using
annual surpluses of over $900 million.
Until the early 1930' s, the Bureau of the Budget
continued to focus primarily on management improvement
accomplished by a budget review that emphasized reduction
in expenditures. The initial year of the New Deal brought
no change . in the Bureau's role or increase in its staff.
Responsibility for many of the emergency relief and public
works planning and coordinating functions were assigned to
newly created agencies. The change came as a result of the
report of the President's Committee on Administrative
Management. The large quantity of federal programs in the
1930 's and the recognition that improved procedures for




2 .Vincent J. Browne, The Control of th e Public
Budget (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 194-9)
, P- 91.




President must be supported by a more adequate staff if lie
was to improve his capacity for effective management and
policy formulation. The role of the Bureau of the Budget
as a staff agency was stressed by the President's Committee
in 1937 as follows:
If the Bureau of the Budget is to develop into a
serviceable tool for administrative management to
aid the President in the exercise of over-all control,
it needs greater resources and better techniques. . . .
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget is one of the
few Government officers in the position to advise the
President from an over-all, as opposed to a bureau or
departmental, point of view. He should therefore be
relieved to the greatest possible extent from, the
minor details of administration. He should be
released for duties of maximum importance to the
President. . . . The Bureau of the Budget as a mana-
gerial agency of the President should therefore be made
responsible for the execution, as well as the formula-
tion, of the budget as a national fiscal plan.
2
While the Committee did not specifically recommend that the
Bureau be transferred from the Treasury Department, it did
reject a task force proposal that the Bureau be strengthened
within the Treasury Department. The Committee's stress on
the presidential aspect of budgeting left no doubt about
7,
what was intended.
Under the Reorganization Act of 1939, the Executive
Office of the President was formally established and the




2U.S., President's Committee on Administrative Manage-
ment
,
Administrative Management in the Government of the
United States (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office,
1937), PP. 17-18.
5Burkhead, Government Budgeting, p. 293-
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its increased responsibilities, it emerged as the principal
institutional staff arm of the President. The Bureau assists
the President in the discharge of his budgetary, management,
and other executive responsibilities. The responsibilities
of the Bureau may be grouped under the functions of: (1)
preparation and administration of the budget, (2) improve-
ment of government organization and management, (3) improve-
ment of financial management, (4) legislative analysis and
review, (5) coordination and improvement of federal
statistics
.
More specifically, the Bureau's functions as part
of the Executive Office of the President are as follows:
1. To assist the President in the preparation of
the budget and the formulation of the fiscal
program of the Government.
2. To supervise and control the administration of
the budget
.
3- To conduct research in the development of improved
plans of administrative management, and to advise
the executive departments and agencies of the
Government with respect to improved administrative
organization and practice.
4. To aid the President to bring about more efficient
and economical conduct of Government service.
5. To assist the President by clearing and coordinat-
ing departmental advise on proposed legislation
and by making recommendations as to Presidential
action on legislative enactments, in accordance
with past practice.
6. To assist in the consideration and clearance, and
where necessary, in the preparation of proposed
Executive orders and proclamations, in accordance
with the provisions of Executive Order No. 7298, of
February 18, 1936 (later superseded by Executive
Order No. 11030 of June 19, i960 - 27 PR 584-7).
U.S., Bureau of the Budget, The Bureau of the
Budget: What It Is—What It Does (Washington, D.G.
:






7. To plan and promote the improvement, development
and coordination of Federal and other statistical
services.
8. To keep the President informed on the progress of
activities by agencies of the Government with
respect to work proposed, work actually initiated
and work completed, together with the relative
timing of work between the several agencies of the
Government; all to the end that the work programs
of the executive branch of the Government may be
coordinated and that the monies appropriated by
the Congress may be expended in the most economical
manner possible with the least possible over-
lapping and duplication of effort.-1-
In consonance with the trend toward management orientation,
the Bureau's staff was considerably increased, it developed
the administrative management and. statistical coordination
functions that it still possesses, and it installed appor-
tionment procedures for budget execution. The divisional
organization as established in 1939 remained in effect
2
without significant change until 1952.
The expanded Bureau of the Budget was to be tested
by government organizational and program problems faced,
during the years of World War II. The Bureau discharged
major assignments in establishing emergency agencies, in
planning and budgeting for military procurement, and in formu-
lating programs for inflation control. The Bureau shared its
responsibilities with other agencies in the Executive Office,
the Office of Economic Stabilization, and the Office of War
Mobilization and Reconversion. World War II was to prove
1 U.S., President, Executive Order No. 824-8, Septem-






the soundness of the role of the Bureau as a major agency of
presidential management.
The Ho over Commission Rep o rts and
the Performance Budge t
At the close of World War II, the management orien-
tation in federal budgeting was entrenched in all but one
aspect—the classification of expenditures. In 19^9, the
recommendations of the Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission)
called, for changes in budget classification more in conso-
nance with management orientation. The Commission found
that
. . . the budget olocument itself, because of its size
and complexity and its concentration on services and
materials to be bought rather than programs to be
undertaken, is a relatively ineffective tool of
management .2
The Commission's report emphasized the weaknesses
in the internal operation of the federal government in the
fiscal area. It considered the budget and appropriation
process the heart of management and control of the execu-
tive branch and found the system inadequate, poorly organized,
and failing to predict planned costs with accuracy. With a
view toward correcting the deficiencies, the Commission
Burkhead, G ov erumen t Bud g e ting
,
p. 295-
2U.S., Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, Cone lud i
n
g Rep o rt (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, l9 z^T» P- 8-
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recommended "that the whole budgetary concept of the Federal
Government should he refashioned by the adoption of a budget
based upon functions, activities and projects." ' This
would focus attention on the program rather than on the
objects to be acquired. It would improve management of and
within the executive agencies as well as increase control
over federal expenditures. To what had previously been known
as functional or activity budgeting, the Commission gave the
2label "performance budgeting."
There is no precise definition for performance
budgeting. Authors have exhibited a tendency to make program
budget and performance budget synonymous terms to describe
the same things. Further terminology confusion has been
increased with the association of the term "program budget-
ing" with the planning, programming, budgeting movement.
A performance budget has been broadly defined as
. . . one which presents the purposes and objectives
for which funds are required, the costs of the programs
proposed for achieving those objectives, and quanti-
tative data measuring the accomplishments and work
performed under each program.^"
This definition implies a difference between measuring work
accomplishment and measuring work performed. Work performed
Ibid
.
2The Hoover Commission Report (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Co.," Inc .
,
19zfr9T, pp. v-vii.
5Allen Snick, "The Road to PPB: The Stages of







is the process or activity, while accomplishment becomes the
end product. Performance budgeting increases the responsi-
bility and accountability of management. Its principal focus
is to aid management to assess the work-efficiency of
operating units by (1) casting budget categories in functional
terms, and (2) providing work-cost measurements to facilitate
the efficient performance of prescribed activities. Generally,
the method of accomplishment is by the reduction of the work-
cost data into discreet, measurable units. Early attempts at
performance budgeting were made by federal agencies and local
governments. What were called project budgets or program
budgets were similar to that which is now called a performance
budget. Although they met with limited success, they can be
viewed as initial steps toward improving the necessary
2
if?coordination between planning and budgeting
Following World War II, the federal government pro-
vided an increased impetus, to performance budgeting. The
fiscal 194-8 budget of the Navy Department was submitted both
on the traditional object basis and on a program basis.
While the program basis was not accepted by Congress, the
Navy's efforts influenced the work of the Hoover Commission
and contributed to its recommendation for a performance
budget. This recommendation became a legislative requirement
with passage of the National Security Act Amendment of 194-9










shall be prepared, presented, and justified,
where practicable, and authorized programs shall be
administered, in such form and manner as the Secretary
of Defense, subject to the authority and direction of
the President, may determine, so as to account for,
and report, the cost of performance of readily identi-
fiable functional programs and activities, with segre-
gation of operating and capital programs.!
The Act further provided for the establishment of
the Office of Comptroller in the Department of Defense and
the services. The Comptroller was made the principal
advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all budgetary,
accounting, and statistical reporting matters. The Comp-
trollers of the services were given similar responsibilities
within their departments and were provided the status and
authority needed to permit them to promote better manage-
ment. While the Act recognized the relationship of
budgeting to past performance, it failed to recognize the
important relationship of budgeting to planning and
2programming
.
Although the term "performance budget" did not
appear in it, the Budget and Accounting Act of 1950 provided
that the budget would be in such form and detail as the
President determined. He was given explicit authority to
prescribe the "contents, order, and arrangement of the
National Security Act Amendment, 19 z^9 , Pub. L. 216,








proposed appropriations arid trie statement of expenditures
and estimated expenditures contained in the Budget. . . .
"
It appears evident that it was the Congressional intention
to encourage performance budgeting.
The President applied these budgetary decisions to
the military posture of the nation in 1951 by requesting
the military services to submit their budget requirements
in performance budget form. The services were given con-
siderable latitude in rearranging their appropriation
structures. The Navy's compliance reflects the similarity
of events experienced by the other services. The Navy
stressed broad programs that could be used for evaluation
at the Department of Defense level. However, when imple-
menting the existing programs within the existing bureau
structure, the Navy found that it was necessary to fragment
its operating and funding program. Cost of fleet mainte-
nance and operation was a program administered by the
Bureau of Ships. The cost of manning these ships was
another program under Bureau of Naval Personnel. The
development of the performance budget within the Navy,
where programs paralleled the existing organizational
structure, met the criteria of a budget that revealed
functions but not true programs. The Bureaus, being
contributors to the end products, presented a budget
Budge t and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 •>
Pub. L. 7BZT, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950.
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structure based upon end products. No single Bureau had
total responsibilities for any single product.
Service-wide experience indicated that the results
of implementing the new budget concept fell short of being
a true performance budget. However, the budgeting and
accounting structures of the military departments were
simplified and made more uniform. The old appropriation
categories under which the technical services of the Army
and Naval bureaus had received and administered their own
separate appropriations were replaced by broad classifica-
tions such as Personnel , Operation and Maintenance,
Procurement, Research and Development, and Construction.
This permitted comparisons between the military services
and separated the one-year accounts from those of longer
range
.
A study of the military performance budget by
Frederick Mosher in 19571 concluded that the budgets con-
sisted of groupings of cost supporting elements rather than
operating elements. He proposed a dual budget system
consisting of a program budget for development, appraisal
and approval of future policies and an administrative
budget to facilitate internal programming, management and
2
control. The program budget would be prepared at the
planning level and would integrate the budget and planning
Frederick C. Mosher, Program. Budgetinp;, Theory and








function. It would reflect costs in terms of projects to
"be accomplished rather than items to be purchased. Statis-
tical skill would require emphasis as opposed to accounting
experience. The administrative budget would be prepared
much in the same manner as the process in use at the time.
Its importance, however, would be found In its internal
use for planning and control. The heart of Mosher's
thinking was that "the central idea of the performance
budget ... is that the budget process be focused upon
programs and functions--that is accomplishments to be
achieved, work to be done."
In 1955? Arthur Smithies conducted a survey of the
budget process for the Committee on Economic Development.
Included in his recommendations was the basic proposal
2for both a program budget and an administrative budget.
During the same year a Second Hoover Commission expanded on
the efforts of the original body. It met with the purpose
of reviewing and evaluating the success of the performance
budget and to recommend any necessary changes. Its Task
Force on Budget and Accounting recommended:
That the executive budget continue to be based
upon the function, activities and projects ade-
quately supported by information on program costs
and accomplishments, and by review of performance
by organizational units where these do not coincide






"Smithies, Eudg etary Process
, pp. 257-65-
U.S., Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, Task Force Report, Budgeting and




Emphasis was to be placed on programs as well as
on performance. The system proposed would enable future
budgeting to be made on a cost basis and oriented toward
results rather than procurements. As in the concept
forwarded by the first Ploover Commission, the budget would
be based on performance, or end results. The Commission
further recommended that government accounting be accom-
plished on a cost accrual basis, which would provide
necessary management information to enable the President
and Congress to equate resources expended and results
achieved. A year later, a close version of these proposals
was enacted into law. Public Law 863 provided for cost-
based budgets, an accrual accounting program, and a
simplified allotment system. It is interesting to note
that as late as 'December 1, 1968, only 37 per cent of the
government agencies had complied with the provisions
requiring an accrual-based system.
The purpose of the preceding paragraphs has been
to present the development of the budgetary process and its
reforms in the federal government. This process directly
relates to a discussion of planning, programming, budgeting
presently in effect in the Department of Defense. Parallel-
ing the development of the budgetary process in the
government was a similar development in the Department of
Defense. The following chapter is devoted to those
Class notes, Governmental Budgeting— PAd 251B,
Naval Financial Management Program, 1969.
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legislative enactments, executive directives and related
procedures that created the environment that led to the
planning-programming-budgeting system as it exists today.

CHAPTER III
THE EVOLUTION OP THE DEPARTMENT OE DEFENSE
Background
Since 1789 the nation has always had a single
authority in control of its armed services. Article II,
Section 2, of the Constitution provides that the President
of the United States will "be the Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy. This concept of single authority has not
changed with the development of large armed forces with
the capability to destroy nations. As C. W. Borklund.
comments
:
America's organization for national security has
evolved within the framework of its Constitution,
its customs, and its traditions.. Powers bearing on
national security are vested by the Constitution in
the Government as a whole, and are shared primarily
by the President and the Congress. Under a system
of checks and balances, these . . . elements have
developed distinctive patterns ... in their concern
for national security. -*-
While the President's military responsibility is
the same today as it was in the past, there has been a
drastic change in the organizational pattern of support
for him In the execution of his responsibilities. During
the first decade of the Republic, a single deputy, the







Secretary of War, was his sole assistant. Then, in 1798,
following the fleet buildup for the Barbary Coastal Wars,
the Department of the Navy was established. For the next
150 years disputes between the two military departments
were settled, by the President alone. With the passage of
the National Security Act bf 19 z'-7 ancL the establishment of
the Office of Secretary of Defense, the President once
2
again acquired a single deputy for defense matters.
In the years between 1798 and 19zl-7 coordination of
activities between the War and Navy departments was con-
sidered necessary only at the coast line. Those problems
peculiar to the sea were a concern to the Navy and those
of the land were in the domain of the Army. Since Army and
Navy missions seldom overlapped, military policy was not
a major concern. Further, except in time of war, the size
of the departments was comparatively small and as a result
the President was not unreasonably burdened with two
separate military departments reporting to him. However,
with the conclusion of each conflict involving our armed
forces, proposals were made in the hope of achieving a
closer coordination and consolidation between the services.'
Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense: The
American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century
"(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 26.
2U.S., Congress, National Security Act of 194-7
,
Public Law 253, 80th Cong., July 26, 194-7', in Committee
Print, 85th Cong., 2d sess., 1958.





In the immediate post-World War I period a great deal
of interest was generated for unification of the armed
services. There were two primary reasons for this. First
was the high cost of the war coupled with the problems that
were brought to light regarding the waste of time, money,
and resources caused by conflicting demands on the nation's
war materials from uncoordinated service demands. Secondly,
the advent of a new technology, the combat aircraft, upset
the traditional lines of demarcation between the juris-
dictional areas of land and sea for the Army and Navy
Departments. The early pioneers of military aviation led
by General Mitchell made a concerted effort before Congress
for a law establishing a third service and a Secretary of
Defense responsible for all national defense. As a result
of the pressure for more efficiency and economy, more than
a dozen studies and in excess of fifty bills and resolutions
were presented to Congress between 1921 and 194-5? essentially
requesting a unified organization to handle military
2
affairs. Few of these bills ever went beyond committee
investigation, none were approved, and the military establish
ment continued in status quo until after World War II.
1Charles J. flitch, "Decision-Making in the Department
of Defense," A series of four lectures at H. Rowan Gaither
Lectures by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
delivered at the University of California, Berkeley,
April 5-9, 1965.





A.s in previous conflicts, deficiencies in the armed
forces were brought to light during the Second World War
that generated further discussion of the idea of a single
military establishment. The key factors behind the unifi-
cation efforts, however, were the assumption of Free World
leadership by the United States; the advance in technology
with the development of the atomic bomb and ballistic
missiles; the success of the combined operations during the
war, and the increased costs of developing new weaponry as
opposed to the public demand for economy in military spend-
ing. An objective appraisal would readily recognize the
military as only one facet of a many-sided problem involving
economic growth, internal security, foreign policy, and
national goals.
The threat of a nuclear war demanded that careful,
coordinated and thorough planning be accomplished for both
preventive efforts and counterattack, looking back on this
period, W. W. Kaufmann wrote:
Heretofore, the tasks of the armed forces in peace-
time had been primarily to maintain cadres of trained
officers and men, to engage in mobilization planning,
develop prototypes of the weapons they would like to
order in quantity, and try to foresee the circumstances
and places in which they would be called upon to fight.
Each Service had had a [fighting] capability in being,
especially the Navy; but these forces were rarely
expected to become involved in major military operations
until after America's friends had been precipitated into
a war. . . . Nov/ all this had changed. Contingency-
plans might have to be executed, forces in being might
have to be used without a period of grace for mobili-
zation. 1
1William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strateg;/ (New
York: Harper & Row, 196 Z0, P- 186.
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Economy had long been one of the supporting arguments
for most proposals for military department unification, and
it was in this atmosphere that President Truman engaged in
his controversial efforts to unify the services as a measure
to reduce costs and increase efficiency. He was later to
write that he had
not fully realized the extent of the waste and ineffi-
ciency existing as a result of the operation of two
separate and uncoordinated military departments until
I became chairman of the special Senate committee
created in 194-1 to check up on the national defense
program- I had long believed that a coordinated defense
organization was an absolute necessity. The duplica-
tions of time, material, and manpower resulting from
independent Army and Navy operations which were paraded
before my committee intensified this conviction. 3-
These efforts were formalized under the President's
leadership with the passage of the National Security Act of
194-7-
The National Security Act of 194-7
In a broad interpretation, the National Security
Act of 194-7 was to provide for the total defense needs of
the nation. This was to be accomplished by the establish-
ment of three levels of defense organization. The national
security machinery consisted of the National Security
Council and the National Security Resources Board at the
apex, and the National Military Establishment under a
pSecretary of Defense located a level below. The function
Harry S. Truman, Memo irs by Harry S. Truman
,
Vol. II
Years of Trial and Hope (New York: "' Doubleday, 19557, p. 4-6.
U.S., Statutes at Large, XLI, 253, sec. 101,
Title I, II. '
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of these agenci.es was to provide integrated policies and
procedures for all departments of the government relating
to national security. Both elements of the policy process,
the ends and the means, had "been provided by the Act. Policy
would be determined in light of resource capability and
resource planning would he related to policy objectives.
The National Security Council (NSC) would he respon-
sible for advising the President on the coordination of
domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national
security. Two duties were assigned the Council: first, to
consider the nation's objectives, commitments, and risks, and
to recommend action on the country's actual and potential
military power; second, to recommend action on matters of
common interest to federal activities concerned with
national security. The National Security Council became a
means for making the President aware of the need for a
decision and was devised to present to him ultimate solutions
as well as the problems.
The National Security Resources Board would be
responsible for advising the President regarding the coordina-
tion of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization. In
peacetime it would be involved primarily in the review of
2the nation's resources and productive capacity. In wartime
the Board would develop for the President an optimum
'Ibid
.
, sec . 101.
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government
Expenditures, Hearing s , 80th Cong., 19^7, pp. 23, 372.
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allocation of resources and production between civilian and
military requirements. By controlling and allocating
critical materials the board would insure consonance between
military plans and material capacity. As with the National
Security Council, the concept of operation of the National
Security Resources Board wa's that the individuals bearing
the responsibility to implement policy would participate in
policy formulation.
The third level of defense organization established
by the Act was the National Military Establishment, since
renamed the Department of Defense. The operating level of
the new establishment consisted of three separately organized
and administered departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force.
The Act further provided for the establishment of "unified
commands in strategic areas"; however, no stipulations as
to the chain of command were included. The Secretary of
Defense, a civilian, and principal assistant to the President
2in all matters relating to national security, was assigned
carefully enumerated duties. Powers and duties not
specifically conferred upon the Secretary of Defense were
retained by the individual service Secretaries.
Prom the viewpoint of the military, the National
Security Act of 194-7 can be considered a budget reform. The
duties conferred on the Secretary of Defense were to have
U.S., Statutes at Large
,
LXI , 253, sec. 211.
2Ibid
.
, sec . 202.
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an impact upon the military budget process. They were (l)
to establish general policies and programs for the national
military establishment; (2) to exercise general direction,
authority, and control over the establishment; (3) to
eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlap in procurement,
supjjly, transportation, sto'rage , health, and research; and
(4) to supervi.se and coordinate budget matters of the corrrpo-
nent activities, including formulation of budget estimates
for the establishment. The means had been established for
a centralized review of the defense budget prior to
Presidential approval and submission to Congress.
Impressive as the administrative responsibilities of
the Defense Secretary might appear, his authority was tightly
limited. Since his authority was only "general," the services
insisted upon retaining a great deal. The service Secre-
taries were required only to inform the Secretary of .Defense
first, before they were permitted to present to the Presi-
dent, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Congress any reports,
recommendations, or appeals they felt were necessary regard-
ing the crucial requests for departmental budget funds.
Thus, they could, and often did, bypass the Secretary of
Defense. In effect, the National Security Act of 1947
created not a unified department but a confederation of
John C. Pies, The Management of Defense: Organiza-
tion and Control o f the LI . S~ Armed Fore e
s
( Bal timor e : The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), p. 102.
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three military departments presided over by a Secretary of
]Defense with carefully enumerated powers.
Ev olution and Reorgani zation, 194-9-1958
The obvious weaknesses of the 194-7 legislation led
to Congressional and Executive action that sought to strengthen
the position of Secretary of Defense. These were the 194-9
amendments to the basic Act, the Reorganization Plan of 1953,
and the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.
limited defense budgets and interservice conflicts
on the question of roles and missions characterized the years
19^7-194-9. The first Secretary of Defense, James Rorrestal,
recognized the relationship of the problem of the service
roles and missions to the problem of budgetary allocation.
It had become clear to him that the issue of service missions
would have to be settled before the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
could be expected to agree on a defense budget. Twice in 194-8,
at Key West and at Newport, he met with the JCS to consider
the key question of roles and missions. The papers signed at
the end of these meetings were nothing more than a compromise
restatement of what each service considered its previous
status. As a result, the Joint Chiefs did no more than
2
endorse the proposals of each service. An example of how
far apart the services were in relation to overall national
policy was evident in the defense budget for fiscal 1950.








A Presidential directive placed a ceiling of $15 "billion on
the Department of Defense budget for fiscal year 1950. The
services had only been able to agree on an absolute minimum
of 112.-5.5 billion as necessary military funding to carry out
their missions. Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense did
not have the statutory power to order a resolution of the
problem
.
Recognizing the deficiencies in the organizational
structure, the Secretary, in his first annual report to the
President, recommended that "the statutory authority of the
Secretary of Defense should be materially strengthened . . .
by making it clear that the Secretary of Defense has the
responsibility for exercising ''direction, authority, and
control' over the department and agencies of the National
Military Establishment." Secretary Porrestal further recom-
mended that the Secretary of Defense be the only representa-
tive of the National Military Establishment to sit on the
National Security Council. Under the 19^-7 Act, the service
Secretaries were not only Heads of Executive Departments
but were members of the Council as well. No official action
2
was taken on his report.
Shortly after the Secretary's report, the Hoover






2U.S., Department of Defense, First Report of th e
Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: ""Government Printing
Office, TW&T, pp. z!~-20.
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submitted its report to Congress. The report said that the
defense policy process was operating improperly and made the
indie tmen I that
:
Presently, national policy is not emanating,
clearly and firmly, from above and descending effec-
tively through the chain of agencies for translation
into an efficient economical military establishment
measured against our national needs. As a result, the
military have picked up the ball of national policy
and are starting down the field with it. Just by being
concerned about our national security—but at the same
time with an eye to individual Service ambitions, they
have sometimes made their own assessments and appraisals
of our "objectives, commitments, and risks" and have
translated them into their own ideas of our proper
military strength.
1
Further, because the individual agencies concerned
with national security
are not performing their respective functions adequately,
either individually or in relation to each other . . .
instead of policy determining strategy, and strategy
in turn determining its military implementation in terms
' of the size and nature of the military establishment,
the tendency is in the reverse direction. To far too
great an extent the unilateral arms and policies of the
military services are combining to make the strategy
they are supposed to serve, and the strategy is tending
to make the national policy.
The recommendations of the Hoover Commission task force closely
resembled those of Secretary Forrestal and provided the
impetus that resulted in Congressional enactment on August 10,
194-9j of a public law, Title IV to the National Security Act
of 19zl-7« In addition to requiring performance budgeting for
U.S., The Commission on Organization of the Execu-
tive Branch of the Government , Task Force Report, The National
Security Organization (Washington, h.C: Government Printing







the first time in a governmental department, as discussed
in Chapter II, it clarified and strengthened the role of the
Secretary of Defense. The primacy of the Secretary of
Defense as the principal assistant to the President on
defense matters was stressed. The Army, Navy, and Air Force
lost their status as executive departments and all that went
with it. The Secretary of Defense was given a Deputy and
three Assistant Secretaries; a Chairman was provided for the
1Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Staff was doubled.
One of the Assistant Secretary posts created was that of
Conrptroller , thus providing for uniform budget and fiscal
procedures to be established for all the military departments
and firm budget controls to be set in the Office of Secretary
of Defense. The Comptroller's responsibilities under the
Secretary of Defense were
:
A. To supervise and direct the preparation of the
budget estimates of the Department of Defense and
B. to establish or supervise the execution of
1. Principles, policies, and procedures to be
followed in connection with organizational
and administrative matters relating to
(a) the preparation and execution of the
budgets
(b) fiscal, cost, operating, and capital
property accounting
(c) progress and statistical reporting
(d) internal audit.
2. Policies and procedures relating to the
expenditure and collection of funds
administered by the Department of Defense and
C. to establish uniform terminologies, classifications
and procedures in all matters.
2
1U.S., Public Law 216, 81st Cong., August 10, 194-9,




The military manager of today is well acquainted
with such names as Wilfred J. McNeil, Charles J. Hitch, and
Robert N. Anthony, who were subsequently to perform the duties
of Defense Comptroller. Many of the detailed considerations
of military managers of today were to originate with these
individuals.
Several developments over the next decade were to
strengthen civilian authority over the militai?y chiefs. On
April 30, 1953 5 & reorganization plan for the Pentagon was
submitted to Congress. Congressional willingness to look
upon it favorably resulted from their awareness almost
immediately after the Korean War of the resurrection of
intensive battles over roles, missions, and money.
The plan, which was to become Presidential Reorgani-
zation Plan. No. 6 of 1953, stressed the need for strengthened
civilian control, improved strategic planning, and effective-
ness with economy. In transmitting this reorganization plan
to Congress, the President made it clear that "no function
in any part of the Department of Defense or any of its compo-
nent agencies is to be performed independent of the direction,
2
authority and control of the Secretary of Defense." The
old statutory agencies, the Munitions Board and the Research
Ries, Management of Defense
,
p. 152.
2U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations,
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting




and Development Board established in 19-1-7 5 had proved unwieldy
in handling their Korean War responsibilities and were
abolished and their functions transferred to the Secretary of
Defense, whose office was expanded from three Assistant Secre-
taries to nine. Further, the Secretaries of the military
*
departments, in addition to being heads of their own respec-
tive departments, were to become "operating managers" for the
Secretary of Defense.
Centralized defense policy mating, reduced budgets,
new weapon technology, and the successful launching of the
first man-made satellite by the Russians continued to generate
sufficient pressure by 1958 for further reorganization of the
Department of Defense. Signed into law on August 6, the
Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1958 increased further
the responsibilities and authority of the Secretary of Defense,
especially in respect to the operational direction of the
armed forces and in the area of research and development. The
services were no longer to be "separately administered" and
instead were only to be "separately organized." A new post
of Defense Research and Engineering was created not only to
"supervise" research and development activities but to "direct
2
and control" those activities needing centralized management.
Further, in the 1958 reorganization the military departments
which had been acting as executive agents in the operational
1
Borklund, Department of Defense
,
pp. 65-66.
2U.S., Department of Defense Reorganization Act of




control of the unified and specified commands were removed
from the chain of command. The command line now runs from
the President to the Secretary of Defense , through the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, to the unified commands.
In sum, the eleven-year evolution from a Defense con-
federacy to a federal form of centralized control strengthened
the position of the Secretary of Defense by providing tight
financial controls, stronger and more direct lines of communi-
cation and command, and an increase in Assistant Secretaries
to handle specific areas. Furthermore, the Secretary was
provided broad authority, subject to Congressional veto, to
transfer, reassign, abolish, and consolidate major combat
functions, and, without prior Congressional review, to reassign
noncombat functions and assign new weapon systems to a service
for production, procurement, and operational control. Today,
virtually the only statutory limitations on the Secretary's
authority are a prohibition against merging the military
departments or creating a military staff for himself besides
the JCS. 2
These changes greatly enhanced the authority of the
Secretary of Defense as the true operating head of the
Defense Department; however, it was not until 1961 that the
full powers of the Secretary of Defense to run the department




2Stanley L. Falk, National Security Management: The
National Security Structure (Washington, D . C . : Industrial
College of the Armed Forces, 196?), p. 79.

CHAPTER IV
PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING IN THE
DEPARTMENT OP - DEFENSE 1961-1970
The Defens e Budgetary Process Before 1961
Prior to 1961, military planning and financial
management within the Department of Defense were treated as
independent activities. Military planning fell within the
purview of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the planning organi-
zations of the military department s. Financial management,
based on Congressional appropriation codes such as pay,
operations and maintenance, or procurement and budgeted for
the next succeeding year, was the function of the Comptroller.
As a consequence the Secretary of Defense found himself in
a position each year where he had, at least implicitly, to
make major decisions on force programs with insufficient or
1inadequate information. Furthermore, each year the plans
and programs of each service had to be cut back severely
to fit the budget ceilings. This was accomplished by program
cancellations or postponements for that year. Unrealistic
plans continued to grow beyond the budget year in the hope
that the next year the budget ceiling would be higher.





These deficiencies did not go unnoticed- A 1958
Rockefeller report recommended a move toward a program
budget which would correspond more closely to a coherent
strategic doctrine.
It should not "be too difficult, for example, to restate
the presentation of the Service budgets, so that instead
of the present categories of "procurement," "operations
and maintenance," "military personnel," etc., there
would be a much better Indication of how much goes for
example, to strategic air, to air defense, to anti-
submarine warfare, and so forth.
1
In the summer and fall of 1959, Representative George
Mahon, Chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Sub-
committee, addressed two letters to the Secretary of Defense.
His first letter stressed the importance of looking at the
Defense budget in terms of major military missions, by
grouping programs and their costs by mission. His second
letter called for "more useful information and for a
2practical means of relating costs to missions." Other
students of the Defense management problem, notably the
Rand Coiporation, were to reach a similar conclusion. The
blueprint for such a system was published by Rand in March,
I960, entitled The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age
by Charles J. Hitch and Roland McKean. This publication
presented a detailed treatment of the previously mentioned
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, International Security :
The Military Aspect
,
Report of Panel I of the Special Studies
Project (Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday, 1958), pp. 58-59-
2Charles J. Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense




gap in the management of the nation's defense effort.
Moreover, the author dealt at length with the proposition
that the information available to managers in the Department
of Defense was incompatible with the decisions which were
to be formulated based on this information. Concurrently
with the pressure for budgetary reform within the Defense
Department was the recommendation made by Senator Jackson's
Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, at the end of
I960, calling for "more vigorous employment of the broad
authority already vested in the Secretary of Defense."
The ascendency to the Presidency of John P. Kennedy in 1961
and his appointment of Robert S. McNamara as Secretary of
Defense were to bring the force-fulness recommended by the
Jackson committee and a new system designed to more effec-
tively allocate resources available for defense.
The Department o f De fense Program-
Budget System, T%1-1%9
The new Secretary of Defense was directed by the
President "to determine what forces were required for
national defense and to procure and support them as
2
economically as possible." McNamara appointed Charles J.
Hitch to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Samuel A. Tucker, National Security Management: A
Modern Design for Defense Decision: A. McNamara-Hitch-Bnthoven
Anth ology (Wa- s-b ing'ton
,
D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed
Porces, 1967), p. 12.
2Robert S. McNamara, "Managing the Department of
Defense," Civil Service Journal, IV, No. 4 (April-June,
1961), 1-5: : .
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and to initiate efforts to coordinate a management system
compatible with his desires. Both men felt that financial
management within the Pentagon had as its greatest weakness
the lack of data needed "to make the really crucial deci-
sions, particularly on the major forces and weapon systems
needed to carry out the principal missions of the Defense
1Establishment .
"
Accordingly, to purify the information available by
bridging the gap between military planning and budgeting,
2Hitch employed a concept called "programming." The result
was the installation in 1961 of a unified planning-
programming-budgeting system.. Its purpose was to integrate
all three interrelated phases of the decision-making process-
planning, programming, and budgeting—together with the
related activities of progress reporting, control, and
evaluation.
Devised in an effort to tie all facets of the
Defense effort together, the system relates national
security objectives to strategy, strategy to forces, forces
to resources, and resources to costs, all within the same
conceptual framework and all projected several years into
the future. The key element of the process was the Five
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government
Operations, Organizing for Nationa l Security (Washington.
D.C.: Government Printing Office,' 1961), Part VIII,
p. 1005.




Year Force Structure and Financial P3?ogram, which was
designed to aid the programming function at the highest
Department of Defense level.
To facilitate the decision-making process, emphasis
was placed on program elenients. A program element is defined
as :
A description of a mission by the identification
of the organizational entities and resources needed
to perform the assigned mission. Resources consist
of forces, manpower, material quantities, and costs
as applicableA
Every Department of Defense activity falls within one of the
program elements. Related groups of program elements that
support one another or have a common mission are grouped
into major programs.
In June, 1966, the composition of Hitch's original
nine major programs was modified, as well as the name of
the Rive Year Force Structure and Financial Plan to Five
Year Defense Program. This plan is the official program
for the Department of Defense. The programming system
provides the means for submission, review, record keeping,
and decision-making on the Defense program. The planning,
programming, resource, materiel and financial management
systems of all Department of Defense components are corre-
lated with the programming system.
U.S., Department of Defense, The PI ann in g , Pro
g
ram-
ming and Budgeting System, Department of Defense Instruction
7045.7, October 2§, lWJ7
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The ten major programs are as follows:
1. Strategic Force s.—Consists of strategic offensive,
strategic defensive and civil forces.
2* General Purpos e Forces.—Consists of force- oriented
program elements other than those in Program 1, including
the command organization associated with these forces, the
logistics organizations organic to these forces, and the
related logistics and support units which are deployed or
deployable as constituent parts of military or naval forces
and field organizations.
5* Intelligence and Communications .--Consists of missions
and activities directly related to combat forces, but not a
part of any of the forces listed in Program 1 or 2, on which
independent decisions can be made. Includes resources for
primarily national or centrally directed Department of
Defense objectives for intelligence and security; specialized
missions such as weather service, aerospace rescue/recovery,
and oceanography.
4. Airlift-Sealift . --Consists of airlift, sealift, and
other transportation organizations. Includes command and
logistics and support units organic to these organizations;
costs are net after deduction of revenue from users.
U.S., Department of Defense, Planning Programming
Budgeting, A pamphlet issued by The School of Systems and
Logistics and the Defense Weapons Systems Management Center,
Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, Ohio (The Ohio State University Research Founda-
tion, 1969), pp- 35-57.
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5- Guard and Reserve Forces.—Elements are arranged
by program (Strategic Forces, General Purpose Forces,
Intelligence and Communications, Airlift and Sealift,
Central Supply and Maintenance, Training, Medical and other
personnel activities, and Administration and associated
activities, in order to facilitate relating guard and
reserve forces to the active forces.
6. Research and Development .—Includes all research
and development activities which are not related to items
that have been approved for procurement and deployment.
These latter costs appear in appropriate elements In other
programs.
7. Central Supply and Maintenance .—Consists of supply
and maintenance that is not organic to other program elements,
Includes non-deployable supply depots and maintenance depots
both industrially funded and non-industrially funded.
8
.
Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activi-
stie s. --Consists of training, medical, and other activities
associated with personnel, excluding training specifically
identified with another program element, and excluding
housing, subsistence, medical, recreational and similar costs
that are organic to another program element (such as base
operations)
.
9. Administration and Associated Activities .—Consists
of resources for the administrative support of departmental
and major administrative headquarters, field commands and
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administrative activities (not elsewhere accounted for),
construction support activities and miscellaneous activities,
10. Support of Other Nations . --Includes the costs
involved in Military Advisory Groups, military assistance
and military sales programs.
The program budget as installed by Hitch and
McNamara in the Department of Defense was not intended to
replace the traditional appropriation line item budget sub-
mitted to Congress. The Defense budget was presented by the
Secretary of Defense to Congress in major program categories
followed by a translation of these programs into their
appropriation categories by the Defense Comptroller. The
relationship between the program elements and the tradi-
tional functional accounts was utilized as the cross-walk
for converting the military funding requirements developed
under the program approach into the additional line item
accounts of the existing budget. The two systems combined
to provide a total picture of the sources and their uses
in the defense establishment. For the first time, the
relation of resource requirements to resource availability
and the full implications of the total defense program was
possible
.
U.S., Department of Defense, Study Report on the
Programming System for the Office of the Secre t a
r
y of
Defense [Washington , D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense [Comptroller], 1962), pp. 1-3 - II-4-.
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Supporting and Dissenting Views
The movement toward the planning, programming,
"budgeting (PPB) system within the defense department can be
viewed, in the context of the growth of power of the Secretary
of Defense over the various departments as well as the high
esteem President Johnson held for Secretary of Defense
McNarnara. The new process was utilized in the preparation
and presentation to the members of the Armed Services and
Appropriation Committees of the fiscal year 1963, 1964, and
1965 defense budget. Implementing the system within the
defense department did not require significant changes in
the Congressional budgetary process. Further, it contained
the elements necessary for rational decision-making favored
by Secretary McHamara. Charles Hitch's words reflect the
feeling of importance of the planning, programming, budget-
ing process within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense
:
With this management tool at his command, the
Secretary of Defense is now in a position to carry
out the responsibilities assigned to him by the
National Security Act, namely to exercise direction,
authority, and control over the Department of Defense--
and without another major reorganization of the
defense establishment .
1
A further viewpoint on the value, importance, and
success of the planning, programming, budgeting system in
the Department of Defense has been expressed by William W.
Kaufmann
:





The planning-programming-budgeting system had
worked remarkably well in three different aspects. It
had provided the Secretary with a much clearer and more
meaningful representation of the department's vital
functions than was ever available, and it had enabled
him to relate and compare competitive and complementary
activities much more readily than by the examination
of separate service budgets drawn up according to the
traditional accounts. The system also gave a sense of
order and perspective to the annual budget cycle with
its emphasis on a five year plan and program change
proposals. Above all, it provided a common format and
language for the Services and obliged them to think in
terms of major missions of interest to the development




In August, 1965, President Johnson instructed his
cabinet members and heads of agencies to introduce the new
planning-programming-budgeting throughout the government.
Shortly thereafter, the Bureau of the Budget issued general
instructions to all major federal departments and agencies
to assist in establishing the system. These instructions
defined the budget as a financial expression of a program
plan. Documents related to the preparation and justification
of the budget submission emphasized, as the more important
factors for inclusion, the setting of goals, definition of
objectives, and the development of planned programs for
achieving the goals.
Prior to implementing the new system, the budget
2process was seen to have the following disadvantages:
Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy
,
pp. 290-91.
2U.S., Bureau of the Budget, Bulletin 63-5
,
Octo-
ber 12. 1965; and Bulletin No . 6 5-5 , Supplement , Febru-
ary 21 \ 1966.
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1. Program review was accomplished in too short a
period.
2. Objectives and programs of agencies often lacked
clarity.
3. Accomplishments were not completely measured.
4. Alternatives were insufficiently presented for
consideration by top management.
5. Future year costs were not presented in a manner
permitting a complete examination.
6. Formalized planning and system analysis were not
being included in the budgetary process.
These disadvantages were to be overcome by the PPB
system in each agency that would be made to provide more
effective information and analysis to assist the middle
manager decision makers, as well as the agency head and the
President, in deciding on which resources would be allocated
between competing programs. The improved system was
intended for year-round use; however, its results were to be
especially visible during the spring preview of the budget
by assisting in the provision of more informed and coordinated
budget recommendations.
Essentially, the new PIanning-Programming-Budge ting
system was based on three concepts: First, within each
agency an analytic capability would exist which would permit
in-depth analyses of the agency's objectives and its pro-
grams to meet these objectives. Second, there would exist
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a multi-year Planning and Programming process that would
include the use of an information system for the presentation
of pertinent data essential to the making of major decisions
by agency heads and the President. Third, there would exist
a Budgeting process which could take "broad program decisions,
translate them into decisions in a "budget context, and
present the appropriate program and financial information
for Presidential and Congressional action.
Allen Schick, a Research Associate at the Brookings
Institution, has followed the planning-programming-budgeting
system since its inception. He maintains a viewpoint that
there may be constraints placed upon the program budget
system in the area of politics' and decision making.
The conservatism of the political system . . . tend
to minimize the decisional differences between tradi-
tional and PPB approaches. However the availability of
analytic data will cause a shift in the balance of eco-
nomic and political forces that go into the working of
the budget .
2
Schick further contends that in the area of decision making
emphasis on the planning function will result in the greater-
centralization of policy making with the Bureau of the
7.
Budget assuming the central role.
Fremont J. Lyden and Ernest G. Miller, eds.,
Planning, Programming, Budgeting: A Systems Approach to
Management (Chicago: Markham .Publishing Co., l9b7T7~
p. 40b:









By 1968, Schick wrote that PPB was premature in that
it was introduced governmentv/ide "before the concepts, organi-
zational capability, political conditions, and informational
resources and techniques were adequately developed. Bertram
Gross agrees with Schick and points out that as early as
1965 top officials within the Bureau of the Budget felt that
the conceptual tools of PPB needed slow and careful develop-
ment despite their long historical background. The President
vetoed a staff recommendation limiting the new system during
the early years to the few agencies more advanced in progi^am
planning.
Schick and Gross also are in agreement in asserting
that PPB gives inadequate attention to the area of political
bargaining and as such runs counter to the way budgeting has
been practiced in. this country for more than half a century.
It is interesting to note that Dror takes issue with Gross
and Schick in that neither view PPB as a part of a policy
making system. It is Dror's contention that PPB must be
considered within the broad framework of efforts to Improve
the policy making system:
Allen Schick, "PPB's First Years: Premature and
Maturing," Mimeographed paper (Washington, D.C.: The Brook-
ings Institution/U.S. Bureau of the Budget, September, 1968).
2Bertram M. Gross, "The New Systems Budgeting,"
Public Administration Review
,




p. 127; and Allen Schick, "Systems Politics
and Systems Budgeting," Public Administration Review , March-
April, 1969, p. 150.

Only such a framework can provide us with the
perspective for understanding the present difficulties
of advancing PPB and with a basis for better prescrip-
tion. The absence of such a framework is the missing
link ... in most of the efforts to introduce and
advance PPB in public administration. ^~
The foregoing are representative of the views
expressed concerning the planning, programming, budgeting
system since its innovation. Pew studies have been accom-
plished that were empirically based and aimed at identifying
the factors contributing to the utilization of PPBS within
particular agencies. The first research accomplished with
this objective of identifying the factors in sixteen domestic
federal agencies was undertaken in mid-1968 by the Bureau of
the Budget. Pactors that appeared to affect the implementa-
tion and utilization of PPBS were studied through interview,
questionnaires, analyses of the agencies' formal and informal
organizational structure, and data on personnel identified
2
as being PPB analysts. This study found that:
1. In most agencies, policy analysis was not being
performed much differently than it was before the advent
of PPB.
2. There was a wide variance in the rate agencies
elected to emphasize analytic capability or the process
for integrating analytic output with decision making.
Yehezkel Dror, "PPB and the Public Policy-Making
System: Some Peflections on the Papers by Bertram M. Gross





^Edwin L. Harper, Pred A. Kramer, and Andrew M.
Rouse, "Implementation and Use of PPB in Sixteen Federal




3. The relative effectiveness of an agency's PPB efforts
was directly related to the degree of actual support and use
of PPB by the agency head.
4-. Agencies exhibited a degree of uncertainty regarding
whether PPB was intended to be used as a management tool
within the agency or primarily to fulfill the requirements
of the Bureau of the Budget. When perceived as a tool of
management, an agency generally made more progress toward
the integration of analyses with decision making.
It is interesting to note that some agencies headed
by highly political people used PPB as a tool for greater
centralized policy control over semiautonomous organizations
which had already formed satisfactory relationships with
their Congressional committees. Other agencies used only
those aspects of PPB they desired, while still others failed
to offer even token support to the more analytic-based
decision-making process.
The answer to the question as to why there has been
a successful introduction and subsequent utilization of
planning, programming and budgeting in the defense department
and apparently unsuccessful implementation governmentwide
may have been provided by Frederick Mosher. It is his
belief that the benefits to be derived from the potential
effects on power distribution within the government are as




Most of the government lacks the "unitaryness" of
the Department of Defense where the decisive power of
the Secretary was enhanced by PPBS and at the same
time contributed assurance of authoritative treatment
of PPBS findings. But this is hardly possible in
fields like education, foreign affairs, natural
resources and many other s.-L
Prospects for the Future
Early in 1969, Dr. William Niskanen, Director of the
Program Analysis Division, Institute for Defense Analysis,
recommended an improved defense management program that
2included the following:
1. That the Office of Secretary of Defense provide the
Services with "explicit, political and budget guidance."
2. That the "efficiency decisions"—those decisions
concerning "planned composition of forces to meet a given
defense output "--be made by a Joint-Service military planning
group rather than within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense
.
5- That the burden of proof be imposed on the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), rather than on the
Services, that any other alternative is preferable to the
specific force proposals advanced by the joint-Service
planning group.
That these recommendations received consideration
is evident in the revised Planning, Programming, Budgeting
Frederick C. Mosher, "Communications," Public
Administration Review
,
March, 1967, p. 60.
p
"William A. Mskanen, "Defense Management After





system initiated by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird for
the fiscal year 1972 Defense budget formulation. This
. . 1
revi si on emphasize s
:
1. More flexible force-level guidance with more specific
fiscal guidance to the Services.
2. Better Service participation in the planning,
programming, budgeting cycle, with more Service freedom in
allocation of proposed resources, but also more responsi-
bility for efficient and economic management of resources.
3. A major shift in planning responsibility from the
Defense Systems Analysis secretariat back to the Services
where it was in the pre--McNamara days.
L \-. A shift in the planning, programming, budgeting
sequence to initiate budget cutting much earlier in the
time cycle, and with the Services having a much greater
say in the budget-cutting process.
5- More stringent cost controls throughout.
Although some aspects of the new planning, program-
ming, budgeting process were implemented earlier in the
preparation of the fiscal year 1971 budget, submitted by
the Services to Defense in September 1969, the full impact
of the new system will not be known for a number of
years.
James D. Hessman, "Services Get Greater Say in
New Budget Plan," Armed Forces Journal
,
CvTI, No. 5
(October, 1969), pp. 20-21.
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The nine major steps in Secretary Laird's fiscal
year 1972 planning, programming, budgeting cycle are:
1. On October 10, 1969, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would
submit to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Volume I
(Strategy) of the FY 72-79 Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
(JSOP) consistent with the national security objectives
established by the President and the National Security
Council. The JSOP will lay out a force level plan for eight
future years and an estimated personnel and budget plan for
five of these years.
2. On December 8, 1969, the Secretary of Defense would
issue to the Service Secretaries, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and the Defense Agencies a tentative "for comment" Strategic
Concepts Memorandum (SCM) containing the guidelines to be
used in the budgetary process.
3- On January 15, 1970, the Secretary of Defense would
issue a "for comment" Fiscal Guidance Memorandum (PGM) for
each of the next five program years. This document informs
the Services how much they can expect to spend to carry out
their planned programs.
4-. On February 18, 1970, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
would submit Volume II (Analyses and Force Tabulations)
of the "unconstrained" JSOP, which is a d.etailed analysis
of what the Joint Chiefs of Staff need in specific forces
to meet the expected threat over the next five years.




While JSOP Volume II will not "be limited by great constraints
it will show the cost implications of both the major forces
and the support categories.
5. On March 4, 1970, following review of JSOP Volume II
and the comments from the Joint Chiefs and the Service
Secretaries on the "for comment" Fiscal Guidance Memorandum,
the Secretary of Defense would issue "tentative" Fiscal
Guidance for the FY 72 budget. Such guidance will be
broken down by major force and support category, and by-
Service for each of the next five fiscal years. While the
Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs will still have
the opportunity for reclama and reallocation action, the
total budget planned for each year and for each Service
will be quite firm. This is the first point at which
strategic and fiscal policy are coordinated Into one docu-
ment. It also represents the decision point at which
inter-Service disputes must be settled.
6. On April 22, 1970, the Joint Chiefs would submit
to the Secretary of Defense their recommended Defense
Program, including force level recommendations, rationale,
and the risks imposed by scaling down force levels in
accordance with the Fiscal Guidance Memorandum in Step 5-
7. On May 22, 1970, following consideration of the
Joint Chiefs' recommended Defense Program, the Service
Secretaries would submit to the Secretary of Defense their
detailed Departmental force level and support program
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recommendations , with their rationale and risk assessments
within the same fiscal guidance used by the Secretary in
Step 5* These recommendations will be in a Program Objec-
tives Memorandum (POM) and will cover the same ground as
the JCS Defense Program; however, the force elements will
be spelled out in greater detail. Tradeoffs in various
force level elements may be proposed by the Service Secre-
taries within established guidelines. Any differences
between the Program Objectives Memorandum and the JCS
Defense Program will be identified and costed in the POM.
8. By July 15, 1970, the Secretary of Defense, after
evaluation of the Joint Chiefs' Defense Program and the
POM's, would issue draft decision papers to the JCS and the
Service Secretaries for comment. The Secretary will make
final Program Decisions during July and will finish by
August 31
•
9. On September 30, 1970, the Services would submit
to Defense their budget estimates based on the approved
program resulting from the effects of all Secretary of
Defense decisions made through August 31. The OSD Comp-
troller- and the Bureau of the Budget will "fine tone" the
budget for submission by the President to Congress in
January 1971-
This new system reflects the opportunity for the
Services to have a greater voice in the planning process
than in previous years. Furthermore, the Services have been
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given a much greater voice in determining how the money
that is available will be spent. Whether the changes in
the system will result in greater efficiency by the
Services in their use of resources must remain a subject




Planning, programming, budgeting within the government
has "been part of an evolutionary process within which federal
budgetary techniques have developed. While it might be
viewed as a giant step, it is still a part of a development
that has been in process for over fifty years. In the
formative years of the government, Alexander Hamilton estab-
lished a central executive budget. The executive initiated
and supervised the execution of all funds made available by
the Congress for the entire federal government. The broad
discretion in these early budgetary arrangements given to
the executive provided a potential for a centrally planned
budget and, after a deliberate study, the allocation of
resources among competing agencies. However, with the
presidency of Thomas Jefferson, the concept of an executive
budget with relatively broad appropriation categories was
replaced by detailed Congressional supervision over the
objects of expenditure.
During the period from 1800 to 1921, Congress was
principally concerned with limiting the power and discretion
of the executive by specifying appropriations in great detail.




the growth of deficiency appropriations. Neither efficient
execution of programs nor the pursuit of long-range objectives
was a primary concern.
The first major change in the federal budgetary
system came with the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and
the establishment of the executive budget. Control appeared
to be the motivating factor behind this Act. The improve-
ment of economy and efficiency through better control over
expenditures became the goal. Under this Act the President
became responsible for the submission of budget requests of
the various agencies in the executive branch of the government
This was an extreme change from the previous policy of frag-
mentation, where each department requested funds directly
from Congress. Furthermore, the Bureau of the Budget was
established in the Treasury Department to provide the
necessary coordination and control of expenditures and
revenues. During the 1920' s the Bureau of the Budget concen-
trated its efforts toward carrying out this financial control
function. Budgeting in the period was completely divorced
from policy making and program decisions.
The expanded activities of the government and the
increase in federal agencies under the New Deal of the 1930 '
s
were to lead to the next step in budget reform. Under the
Eeorganization Act of 1939, the Bureau of the Budget was
moved from the Treasury Department to the newly created
Executive Office of the President. During the next fifteen
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years the Bureau's efforts were devoted to administrative
management that included the administration of World War II
activities.
By 194-9 improvements in managerial efficiency were
recommended "by the first Hoover Commission to replace "budget-
ing "by objects of expenditure with "performance "budgeting."
Appropriations and expenditures would "be classified according
to the type of activity conducted rather than by objects of
expenditure. Within each activity program managers would
be free to shift the resources to insure maximum efficiency.
It was later to be questioned whether these appropriations
adequately revealed the purposes of the Defense activity.
A growing need for a more Informative classification would
be the primary motivation of the programming system. As a
result of the Hoover Commission report work measurement
programs were inaugurated. To improve the efficiency with
which programs were executed was the aim of the Budget and
Accounting Procedures Act of 1950. This reform directed
that improvements be made in accounting systems that would
secure better cost data for each activity or work unit.
Where the budget reforms of the 1920 ' s were directed
toward the financial control function, the reforms immedi-
ately preceding and following World War II were directed
toward managerial efficiency. Primary emphasis in both
periods, however, was given to the efficient use of resources
to carry out approved programs.
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From a military viewpoint, the National Security Act
of 1947 can be considered a budget reform, for it created
the Department of Defense and the quasi-unification of the
Armed Services from which evolved the centralization of power
necessary for a programming budget. Despite the creation of
the Department of Defense, however, the Defense budget con-
sisted essentially of budgets for the three separate
Services. The total funds received were arbitrarily shared
by the Services rather than by consideration of the contribu-
tions of the Services to the defense program in total or by
consideration of programs that cut across Service lines.
The 1949 Amendment to the National Security Act provided for
the position of Comptroller in the Department of Defense,
thus enhancing administrative control through centralization
of the budgetary process. The structural reorganizations
within the Defense Department in 1953 and 1958 focused on
the need for economy and efficiency through improved long-
range planning and granted broad authority to the Secretary
of Defense to achieve this goal.
Compared with the budget process that existed prior
to defense unification, the budget system of the 1950' s was
a significant advance. It had provided a limited means for
translation of military planning into the requisite materiel,
manpower, and other resources. It was an effective instru-
ment of information and a significant means for the Secretary
of Defense to exercise control. Furthermore, the appropriation
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structure of this system was simpler and more uniform than
that which existed earlier.
Recognition that military planning tended toward a
unilateral service basis in the ordering of forces, weapons
systems and activities in the 1950 's led students of
budgeting to propose chang'es. These changes advanced pro-
posals for a program budget that would, aid in development,
appraisal and authorization of future policies and programs
at top levels. Thus, the Department of Defense became the
testing ground for a planning, programming, budgeting system
in the federal government.
Secretary McHamara and his first Comptroller,
Charles J. Hitch, implemented reform by establishing a pro-
gramming process to precede the budget formulation stage.
This process essentially consisted of maintaining a five-year
program, subdivided into output oriented program elements
that would provide a firm basis for budget formulation and
other resource connected management activities.
The programming system with its emphasis on systems
analysis provided the factors that McNamara considered
necessary for making crucial decisions, particularly decisions
on foi?ces and weapons. Although the budgets were in balance
with the defense program as approved by the Secretary of
Defense, all the programs advanced by the Services were not
covered and significant differences of opinion as to the
adequacy of budget levels arose. However, the benefits
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of the programming system in the Department of Defense were
widely recognized, and in August 1965 the President estab-
lished the system on a governmentwide basis, where it has
met with limited success.
Prom 1966 to 1969 the trend in Defense budgetary
reform concentrated on economy and efficiency. Modifica-
tions in the programming system were made; however, it
retained, its major features of an output oriented five-year
program; review of major issues by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Services;
and a program adjustment procedure to keep the five-year
program current throughout a given year. Emphasis on systems
analysis to aid decision makers pervaded the entire process.
This planning, programming, budgeting system within the
Department of Defense survived not only a change in Secre-
taries but a change in administration as well. The basic
cycle has remained under President Nixon and Secretary Laird.
However, the cycle has been altered so that the military
services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff now hold major
responsibility for planning force structure, and systems
analysts have assumed the role of reviewers of the military
plans rather than the initiators of plans as in the
McNamara era when the Services were charged primarily with
implementation. With the fiscal year 1972 budget formula-
tion the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been
provided with both fiscal and broad strategic guidance
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early in the budget cycle, and the Services are permitted
to make decisions within those guidelines.
The search for a more perfect budgetary process is
an unending one. Pressures for more economy and efficiency
in government operations have initiated budget reforms in
the past and will continue* to do so. It is still too early
to tell whether a new and better way to manage the nation's
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